Search results for "Executive compensation"
showing 10 items of 19 documents
Globalization of Monitoring Practices: The Case of American Influences on the Dismissal Risk of European CEOs
2013
Accepted version of an article from the Journal of Economics and Business This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the dismissal performance sensitivity faced by European CEOs, indirectly and directly. The former materializes via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, the latter results from European firms hiring U.S. independent board members. Both influences are expected to result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. Based on …
Determinants of Chairman Compensation
2011
This study examines determinants of chairman compensation in a supervisory board setting and, specifically, the relationship between chairman and CEO compensation. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Sweden, the study indicates that chairman compensation – despite its fixed nature – is reflective of firm performance via a positive relationship to CEO compensation. As CEO compensation is set before chairman compensation, we argue that the chairman may be inclined to conspire with the CEO in earnings management efforts at the expense of monitoring on behalf of investors. Supporting our argument, we find evidence that the gap between chairman and CEO compensation is less at firms where …
CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Listed European Hotel Firms
2020
This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation policies and financial performance in the European hotel sector. We analyze CEO cash-, equity- and total-compensation relationships with two accounting-based and two market-based financial performance proxies, including a bi-dimensional proxy formed by stock market return and risk. This bi-dimensional market-based financial performance proxy enables us to take a deep dive into the relationship between CEO compensation policies and firm risk-taking. We then analyze the nature of this relationship by decomposing market-based risk into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, using five alternative asset-pricing factorial models. Our resu…
Asymmetry of CEO Compensation and the Role of Relative and Macroeconomic Shocks in Risk Taking Incentives
2015
If managers are risk-averse and compensation schemes are not directly linked to shareholder wealth, incentives to allocate effort to manage effects of relative and macroeconomic shocks may be distorted. In this paper we develop a simple model to identify factors that determine the optimal allocation of effort to manage relative and macroeconomic shocks. We then show how serial correlation in shocks, the relative variance of shocks and the ability of managers to influence the effects of shocks on shareholder wealth determine the optimal allocation of managerial effort. Thereafter, we emphasize how CEO compensation depends on performance variables distinguishing between relative and macroecon…
Is Board Gender Diversity a Driver of CEO Compensation?: Examining the Leadership Style of Institutional Women Directors
2017
In this investigation, we aim at examining the influence of institutional female directors on CEO compensation. Specifically, we investigate the impact of institutional female directors as a whole, differentiating by whether female directors have business ties with the firms’ boards on which they sit (pressure-sensitive female directors) or do not have business links (pressure-resistant female directors). We hypothesize that there is a nonlinear association, specifically quadratic, between institutional, pressureresistant and pressure-sensitive female directors on boards, and CEO compensation. Our findings show that CEO compensation decreases with low levels of institutional female director…
The Effects of Internationalization on CEO Compensation
2004
This study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms, we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (international cross-listing), the market for corporate control (foreign board membership), and the product and service market (export and foreign sales). We conclude that all three markets contribute positively to the compensation level of CEOs. We argue that part of the higher CEO compensation in internationally oriented firms - as compared to less internationalized firms within the same country - reflects a risk premium for reduction in job security.Pu…
Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation
2011
Exchange rate and other macroeconomic fluctuations can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration depending on the ability of management to adjust operations. We decompose the changes in CEO-compensation to distinguish between (anticipated-and unanticipated) macroeconomic and “intrinsic” sources. Total US CEO-compensation is measured both including options awarded and options exercised. Both depend strongly on variations in macro-factors but the time patterns differ. Allowing for asymmetric effects on compensation we find that c…
Executive Compensation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
2008
Macroeconomic fluctuations affect corporations' performance through demand and cost conditions. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences if management is unable to forecast macroeconomic fluctuations or unable to adjust operations in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. In this paper we analyze the impact of macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific factors on salaries and bonus of CEOs in 131 Swedish corporations during the period 2001-2006. A distinction is made between anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. The macroeconomic influences on performance and compensation can…
Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style
2019
This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preference…
Executive Incentive Compensation and Economic Prosperity
2008
This paper analyzes the existence of a potential link between the prevalence of long term incentive compensation schemes and the economic prosperity of a country. This issue is previously not addressed in the literature. In a panel regression with fixed effects a strongly significant, positive effect is found between growth of GDP/capita in real terms and this prevalence, while controlling for general investment and institutional variables. However, when the 22 countries of the study are divided into European and non-European, the growth effect found for the entire material accrues only to the non-European countries. It is concluded that long term incentive contracts seem to have no effect …